



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24839
24 November 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3139th meeting (resumed), on 24 November 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled:

"(a) The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

"(b) Letter dated 2 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/22435)

Letter dated 4 April 1991 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/22442)

Letter dated 5 March 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23685 and Add.1)

Letter dated 3 August 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/24386)

Letter dated 19 November 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/24828)".

"In concluding the present stage of the consideration of the item on the agenda, I have been authorized, following consultations among members of the Security Council, to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

'The views of the Security Council having been expressed through its President and by the statements of its members on the extent of compliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations

under the relevant Security Council resolutions, the Council has listened with close attention to the statements by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. The Council regrets the lack of any indication in the statements by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq of how the Government of Iraq intends to comply with the resolutions of the Council. It also regrets the baseless threats, allegations and attacks launched by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq against the Council, the Special Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990). The Council rejects in toto these threats, allegations and attacks.

'Having heard all the interventions in the debate, the Council reiterates its full support for the statement made by the President of the Council on its behalf at the opening of the 3139th meeting (S/24836).

'In the view of the Security Council, while there have been some positive steps, the Government of Iraq has not yet complied fully and unconditionally with its obligations, must do so and must immediately take the appropriate actions in this regard.'"



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/24840
24 November 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter dated 13 November 1992 (S/24810) and in accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 781 (1992), I should like to share with the Council further information received by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) regarding apparent violations of the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Between 13 and 19 November, there appear to have been 73 flights of fixed or rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina other than those exempted in accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 781 (1992) or approved by UNPROFOR in accordance with paragraph 3 of that resolution. Details as to the time and itinerary of these flights are attached in an annex to this letter.

As you will note, 39 of the flights were observed taking off from or landing at an airfield monitored by UNPROFOR. Other flights were observed from UNPROFOR checkpoints in the United Nations protected areas or by UNPROFOR observers deployed elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The remainder of the apparent violations reported were observed by AWACS aircraft deployed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in support of UNPROFOR under paragraph 5 of resolution 781 (1992). The information supplied to UNPROFOR by this source does not, however, identify the locations from which the aircraft concerned took off or at which they landed.

It must also be observed that the AWACS aircraft are not currently operating at night. The nocturnal violations recorded are only those observed by United Nations military observers (UNMOs) at airfields or by UNPROFOR personnel deployed in the neighbouring United Nations protected areas. Until all nocturnal violations are recorded and the 75 additional military observers sought by the United Nations from Member States are deployed, UNPROFOR will not be in a position to provide round-the-clock monitoring of violations of resolution 781 (1992).

All confirmed violations are protested by UNPROFOR to the party concerned.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina not authorized by the United Nations
Protection Force (13-19 November 1992)

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC)		Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
		Start	End		
59	13 November	10.44	10.46	Detected 15 NM north of Gorazde in the vicinity of Skolac. Faded from radar coverage 10 NM north of Gorazde in the vicinity of Kula, probably a helicopter.	South-west 150 KTS Altitude unknown
60	13 November	12.39	12.59	Detected over Split and faded from radar coverage 30 NM north-west of Mostar, in the vicinity of Ouvno, probably a helicopter.	North-east 140 KTS 8500 feet
61	13 November	14.48	14.51	Detected 15 NM north of Gorazde, in the vicinity of Skolac. Faded from radar coverage 10 NM north of Gorazde, in the vicinity of Kula, probably a helicopter.	South 100 KTS Altitude unknown
62	13 November	-	-	UNMOs at Banja Luka Zaluzani airfield reported 11 helicopter movements throughout the day.	--
63	14 November	05.58	07.09	Detected 5 NM south-west of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield. Tracked for 4 NM, probably a helicopter.	North-west Slow Low
64	14 November	06.18	06.23	Detected over Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield, tracked for 3 NM, probably a helicopter.	North-west Slow Low
65	14 November	07.22	08.11	Detected 5 NM south-west of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield, remained in the vicinity of the airfield, probably a helicopter.	South-west 150 KTS Altitude unknown
66	14 November	08.20	08.55	Detected overhead Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield, remained in the vicinity of the airfield, probably a helicopter.	North-east 140 KTS 8500 feet

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC)		Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
		Start	End		
67	14 November	09.09	09.23	Detected 10 NM west of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield, and faded from radar coverage 20 NM north-west of Banja Luka, probably a helicopter.	South 100 KTS Altitude unknown
68	14 November	09.25	09.27	Detected overhead Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield and was tracked for 4 NM, probably a helicopter.	--
69	14 November	10.31	10.35	Detected 10 NM south of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield, and faded from radar coverage 5 NM north-east of Banja Luka, probably a helicopter.	North-west Slow Low
70	14 November	10.38	10.50	Detected overhead Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield, tracked for 4 NM, probably a helicopter, possibly the same as the previous one.	North-west Slow Low
71	14 November	10.16	10.18	Detected 40 NM south-west of Banja Luka in the vicinity of Sanica, and was tracked for 3 NM, probably a helicopter.	South-west 90 KTS Low
72	14 November	10.24	10.30	Detected 30 NM south-west of Banja Luka, tracked for 10 NM, probably a helicopter.	North-east -- Low
73	14 November	12.45	12.51	Detected 30 NM south of Mostar in the vicinity of the Island of Sipan. Tracked for 25 NM and faded from radar contact 5 NM south of Mostar.	North-east 250 KTS Low
74	14 November	09.09	09.10	Galeb, tail number 14148, took off on an announced training flight, no munitions observed. Landed at 0940.	South-east Fast 300 feet
75	14 November	09.13	09.14	Orao aircraft, tail number 25503, took off on an announced training flight, no munitions observed. Landed at 0947.	South-east Fast 300 feet

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SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC)		Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
		Start	End		
76	14 November	09.40	-	Orao aircraft, tail number 25504, took off on an announced training flight, munitions not checked. Landed at 1014.	South Slow Low
77	14 November	09.50	09.51	Orao aircraft, tail number 25169, took off on an announced training flight, munitions not checked. Landed 1026.	South Fast 300 feet
78	14 November	09.55	09.56	Galeb aircraft, tail number 24503, took off on an announced training flight, munitions not checked. Landing time not reported.	South Fast 300 feet
79	14 November	09.58	10.27	Orao aircraft, tail number 25205, took off on an announced training flight, munitions not checked. Landing time not reported.	South Fast Low
80	14 November	10.02	10.03	Orao aircraft, tail number 25261, took off on an announced training flight, munitions not checked. Landed at 1044.	South Fast 300 feet
81	14 November	10.32	-	Galeb aircraft, tail number 24503, took off on an announced training flight, munitions not checked. This report possibly correlates to either flights 7 or 8 observed by AWACS.	South Slow Low
82	14 November	10.40	-	Orao aircraft, tail number 25205, took off on an announced training flight, munitions not checked.	South Slow Low
83	15 November	06.45	-	UNMOs reported that an H-40 helicopter took off from Zaluzani airfield.	South Slow 300 feet
84	15 November	07.22	-	UNMOs reported that a helicopter took off from Zaluzani airfield.	South-east Slow 50 feet

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Time of observation
(UTC)

SRL	Date	Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
85	15 November	09.24	-	UNMOs reported that an H-42 Gazelle helicopter landed and refuelled at Zaluzani airfield on a medical evacuation mission.	Landed
86	15 November	09.40	-	UNMOs reported that an H-42 Gazelle helicopter took off from Zaluzani airfield. Helicopter was equipped with night vision equipment.	East Slow 200 feet
87	15 November	-	-	UNMOs at Mahovijani airfield reported one J21 Jastreb and one J22 Orao aircraft participating in an exercise. All missions were declared training missions.	Details unknown
88	15 November	11.21	11.26	Detected 15 NM south-east of Dobo, tracked for 17 NM and faded from radar coverage 5 NM north-west of Dobo, probably a jet or turbo-propelled aircraft.	North-west 250 KTS 2500 feet
89	15 November	12.38	12.47	Detected 34 NM south-east of Mostar, tracked for 18 NM, probably a helicopter or light aircraft.	North-east 140 KTS 4700 feet
90	15 November	13.15	13.25	Detected 29 NM south-west of Banja Luka, tracked for 23 NM and faded from radar coverage 3 NM south-west of Banja Luka, probably a helicopter or light aircraft.	North-north-east 140 KTS 3800 feet
91	15 November	14.31	14.39	Detected 34 NM south-east of Mostar, and tracked for 8 NM, probably a helicopter.	North-east 80 KTS Low
THE FOLLOWING FIFTEEN FLIGHTS (SERIAL 92-106) OR PORTIONS OF FLIGHTS WERE REPORTED BY MILITARY OBSERVERS AT BANJA LUKA ZALUZANI AIRFIELD					
92	16 November	06.55	--	An H-52 Gazelle helicopter took off on a declared medevac flight, ordnance was not confirmed.	East Slow 300 feet
93	16 November	07.06	--	An H-42 Gazelle helicopter took off on a declared medevac mission, ordnance was not confirmed.	East Slow 300 feet

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SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC)		Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
		Start	End		
94	16 November	07.10	--	A Gazelle helicopter took off, ordnance was not checked.	South-east Slow 100 feet
95	16 November	09.12	--	An H-42 Gazelle helicopter took off, no ordnance observed.	South-west Slow 300 feet
96	16 November	09.40	--	An H-42 Gazelle helicopter took off with medical personnel on board.	North-east Slow
97	16 November	09.50	--	An H-42 Gazelle helicopter took off on declared medical flight.	North-east 200 feet
98	16 November	11.02	--	An HT-40 (Mi-17) helicopter took off on a declared medical flight, destination Petrovac.	North-west Slow 200 feet
99	16 November	11.20	--	An H-42 Gazelle helicopter landed and refuelled.	--
100	16 November	11.35	--	An H-42 Gazelle took off, no ordnance was observed.	--
101	16 November	13.05	--	An H-42 Gazelle took off on a declared medevac, ordnance was not checked.	South-west Slow 200 feet
102	16 November	14.29	--	An H-42 Gazelle helicopter landed, no ordnance was observed.	--
103	16 November	14.37	--	An H-42 Gazelle helicopter landed from medevac, no ordnance was observed.	--
104	16 November	14.53	--	An H-42 Gazelle helicopter took off, destination Dobo, declared medevac.	--
105	16 November	15.40	--	2 H-42 Gazelle helicopters took off on a formation flight and landed after a few minutes.	--

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Time of observation
(UTC)

SRL	Date	Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
106	16 November	16.00	--	An H-42 Gazelle helicopter landed, returning from Dobo medevac flight.	North-east Slow 200 feet
107	17 November	08.15	--	UNMOs reported that a Gazelle helicopter landed at Banja Luka Zaluzani airfield on completion of a reported medevac flight from Dobo. This aircraft had departed Zaluzani on 16 November at 1139, no ordnance confirmed.	--
108	17 November	10.34	--	UNMOs reported that a Gazelle helicopter took off from Zaluzani airfield on a reported medevac flight, ordnance not confirmed.	North-east Slow 400 feet
109	17 November	11.54	11.59	UNMOs reported that an HT-40 (Mi-17) helicopter took off on a reported medevac flight, external pylons but no ordnance observed. Landed back at Zaluzani at 1331.	South Slow 450 feet
110	17 November	12.54	12.57	UNMOs observed that an H-42 Gazelle took off from Zaluzani airfield on a reported medevac flight. Landed back at Zaluzani at 1530, no ordnance was confirmed.	North Slow 500 feet
111	17 November	13.17	13.19	Detected 21 NM south-west of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield. Tracked for 6 NM, before fading from radar coverage, probably a helicopter.	South 120 KTS Altitude unknown
112	17 November	13.07	13.19	Detected manoeuvring 11 NM north-west of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield.	-- Speed and altitude unknown
113	17 November	13.07	13.19	Detected 28 NM south-west of Banja Luka in the vicinity of Sanski Most. Faded from radar contact 8 NM south-east of Bihac.	West 160 KTS Altitude unknown
114	17 November	13.07	13.20	Detected 18 NM west of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield, and was tracked for 5 NM. Faded from radar contact 2 NM south of Prijedor.	North Slow Altitude unknown

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC)		Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
		Start	End		
115	17 November	13.07	13.19	Detected 05 NM south-east of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield in the vicinity of Dragalovci, faded from radar contact 15 NM south of Sanski Most, probably a turboprop or jet aircraft.	South-west 270 KTS Altitude unknown
116	17 November	13.13	13.19	Detected 28 NM south-west of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield. Tracked for 7 NM before fading from radar contact in the vicinity of Mrkomjic-grad, probably a helicopter.	South-west 70 KTS Altitude unknown
117	17 November	13.10	13.19	Detected overhead Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield, manoeuvred in the area for 9 mins. and then faded from radar contact, probably a helicopter.	HQG Speed and altitude unknown
118	17 November	15.20	15.22	HT-40 (Mi-17) helicopter was sighted 5 KM north-east of Zaluzani heading north-east at 600 feet and faded from sight at 1522. Later, this Udbina-based helicopter landed at Zaluzani at 1600, no ordnance was observed.	--
119	17 November	15.13	15.36	Detected 18 NM south-west of Banja Luka Mahovijani airfield. Tracked for 32 NM, crossed the Sava river near Orahova, and faded from radar contact 5 NM south-east of Novska. A portion of this flight was observed by United Nations military personnel on the ground and was confirmed as a helicopter.	North 90 KTS Low
120	18 November	07.20	07.05	A Gazelle helicopter took off from Zaluzani airfield. The helicopter was fitted with weapon pylons. The purpose of the flight was unknown.	South Fast 2000 feet
121	18 November	--	12.47	A Gazelle helicopter landed at Zaluzani airfield. This was reported as a medevac flight but could not be confirmed by observations.	West Fast 300 feet
122	18 November	14.28	14.36	A Gazelle helicopter took off and landed at Zaluzani on a reported technical flight, no ordnance was observed.	North Fast 100 feet

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Time of observation

(UTC)

SRL	Date	Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
123	18 November	14.37	15.38	A Gazelle helicopter took off and landed at Zaluzani airfield. This was reported as a medevac flight but could not be confirmed by observations.	East Fast 300 feet
124	18 November	17.30	--	An unidentified aircraft flew over Sector-N from north-west into the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina heading towards Cazin.	
125	18 November	17.30	--	An unidentified aircraft flew over Sector-N from the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina heading towards Slunj.	
126	18 November	18.50	--	An unidentified aircraft flew over Sector-N from the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina heading towards Vojnic.	
127	18 November	19.05	--	An unidentified aircraft flew over Sector-N from the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina heading towards Slunj.	
128	18 November	21.15	--	An unidentified aircraft flew over Sector-N from the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina heading towards Slunj.	
129	19 November	10.59	11.35	Aircraft detected operating between 8-23 NM east of Banja Luka. Its speed would indicate a jet operating within the area mentioned above.	General HDG West 350 KTS (403 mph) Altitude unknown
130	19 November	12.35	13.43	Detected operating between 18 NM and 40 NM north-east of Sarajevo.	General HDG North-east 280 KTS (322 mph) 1500 feet
131	19 November	13.39	13.41	Detected 37 NM south-east of Mostar, on the border of Montenegro. Tracked for 6 NM.	East 250 KTS (288 mph) 1200 feet
132	19 November	15.29	15.33	Detected 35 NM south-east of Mostar, tracked for 10 NM, and faded from radar coverage 12 NM north of Trebinje.	South-west 300 KTS (345 mph) Altitude unknown



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24841
24 November 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 November 1992 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, 1/

Noting with satisfaction that the two leaders discussed all the issues in the Set of Ideas with the result that there were areas of agreement as noted in the report,

Welcoming the agreement by the two sides to meet again with the Secretary-General in early March 1993 to complete the work on an agreed Set of Ideas,

1. Reaffirms all its previous resolutions on Cyprus, including resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983), 550 (1984) and 774 (1992);
2. Endorses the report of the Secretary-General and commends him for his efforts;
3. Reaffirms also its endorsement of the Set of Ideas including the territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the report of the Secretary-General of 21 August 1992 2/ as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement;
4. Reaffirms further its position that the present status quo is not acceptable and that an overall agreement in line with the Set of Ideas should be achieved without further delay;

1/ S/24830.

2/ S/24472.

5. Notes that the recent joint meetings did not achieve their intended goal, in particular because certain positions adopted by the Turkish Cypriot side were fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas;

6. Calls upon the Turkish Cypriot side to adopt positions that are consistent with the Set of Ideas on those issues identified by the Secretary-General in his report, and for all concerned to be prepared in the next round of talks to make decisions that will bring about a speedy agreement;

7. Recognizes that the completion of this process in March 1993 would be greatly facilitated by the implementation by each side of measures designed to promote mutual confidence;

8. Urges all concerned to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out below:

(a) That, as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces envisaged in the Set of Ideas, the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus undergo a significant reduction and that a reduction of defence spending be effected in the Republic of Cyprus;

(b) That the military authorities on each side cooperate with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus in order to extend the unarming agreement of 1989 to all areas of the United Nations-controlled Buffer Zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other;

(c) That, with a view to the implementation of resolution 550 (1984), the area at present under the control of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus be extended to include Varosha;

(d) That each side take active measures to promote people-to-people contact between the two communities by reducing restrictions to the movement of persons across the Buffer Zone;

(e) That restrictions imposed on foreign visitors crossing the Buffer Zone be reduced;

(f) That each side propose bi-communal projects, for possible financing by lending and donor Governments as well as international institutions;

(g) That both sides commit themselves to the holding of a Cyprus-wide census under the auspices of the United Nations;

(h) That both sides cooperate to enable the United Nations to undertake, in the relevant locations, feasibility studies (i) in connection with the resettlement and rehabilitation of persons who would be affected by the territorial adjustments as part of the overall agreement, and (ii) in connection with the programme of economic development that would, as part of the overall agreement, benefit those persons who would resettle in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the above confidence-building measures and to keep the Security Council informed as appropriate;

10. Also requests the Secretary-General to maintain such preparatory contacts as he considers appropriate before the resumption of the joint meetings in March 1993, and to propose for the Security Council's consideration revisions in the negotiating format to make it more effective;

11. Further requests the Secretary-General, during the March 1993 joint meetings, to assess developments on a regular basis with the Council with a view to considering what further action may be needed by the Council;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a full report after the conclusion of the joint meetings that will resume in March 1993.



Security Council

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25 November 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/24821),

Decides:

- (a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;
- (b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1993;
- (c) To request the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of this period, a report on the development in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).



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24 November 1992

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

After the consultations held on 24 November 1992, the President of the Security Council issued the following statement on behalf of the members of the Council in connection with the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait":

"The members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 24 November 1992 pursuant to paragraphs 21 and 28 of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 6 of resolution 700 (1991).

"After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of the consultations, the President of the Council concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for a modification of the regimes established in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), as referred to in paragraph 21 of that resolution; in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 of resolution 687 (1991), as referred to in paragraph 28 of resolution 687 (1991); and in paragraph 6 of resolution 700 (1991)."



General Assembly
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24 November 1992
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 97 (c)
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS:
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS
AND REPORTS OF SPECIAL
RAPPORTEURS AND
REPRESENTATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 23 November 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see annex) in connection with some parts of the second report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (A/47/635-S/24766) prepared by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 97 (c), and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX

**Statement by the Government of the F.R. of Yugoslavia
in connection with parts of the Report of
Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the
UN Commission on Human Rights**

I. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has carefully and with due attention studied the second report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki and would on this occasion like to draw attention to certain inaccuracies and even, in its view, off-handed assessments on the observance of human rights on the territory of FR Yugoslavia. However, before drawing attention to those elements of the report which, in the opinion of the Federal Government, fail to accurately establish the actual state of affairs, the Federal Government would like to make some general remarks which will, we trust, help get an objective picture of the situation concerning human rights and the efforts and measures of the Government aimed at ensuring the effective realization and efficient protection of those rights.

The Federal Government would, first of all, like to remind that as of July 15 this year, when it assumed office, it has taken a number of measures - in conformity with the Constitution of FR Yugoslavia, almost a third of the provisions of which are devoted to the protection of human rights - with a view to promoting those rights and their genuine protection. Fully aware of the fact that no democratic society can be built without observance of the rights of the individual and the full equality of citizens, without any discrimination whatsoever, it has set up a special Ministry for Human and Minority Rights with the aim of ensuring full compliance with the international obligations and standards the country has assumed in this area. A draft law on amnesty has been drawn up for all acts related to the armed conflict, except for, it goes without saying, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (war crimes and crimes against humanity) and that law is undergoing the parliamentary procedure. The Government has unequivocally, absolutely and with overwhelming public support condemned and rejected the policy of so called "ethnic cleansing" irrespective of where and against which people it is being pursued. On its territory it has vigorously prevented the attempts of unconscientious individuals or groups to make some citizens, non-Serbs, move under pressure or by force (the case of the village of Hrtkovci). The perpetrators of those acts or those suspected of such acts, sanctioned by positive law, have been brought to justice. Those who left out of fear, and this can by no means be described as a large-scale phenomenon, have been given full guarantees that they would be indemnified and enabled to return to their homes. All this has been done in full cooperation with the authorities of the two federal republics. Over 500,000 refugees, not only Serbs but also about 40,000 Moslems and members of other nations, have been taken in by the FR Yugoslavia without any discrimination whatsoever, and the number of refugees is constantly growing. All these unfortunate people have received equal treatment and their misfortune is additionally exacerbated by the fact that they are precisely the ones hardest hit by the harsh sanctions of the international community imposed on the FR Yugoslavia. Without in any way underestimating the assistance being extended by the international community to the refugees on the territory of the FR Yugoslavia must note with bitterness that the aid extended to the refugees on the territory of the FR Yugoslavia is not commensurate with their needs and the impression is gained that these people are discriminated against, as compared to those who have fled to other parts of the former Yugoslavia. With the coming winter and the burden of the sanctions the FR Yugoslavia and the enormous number of refugees it has taken in are facing insurmountable difficulties which will be hard to overcome without a fairer distribution of the assistance extended by the international community, through humanitarian organizations, to all refugees on the soil of the former SFRY.

The Federal Government would on this occasion also like to remind that from the moment it took office it has been doing everything in its power to put an end to the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has provided ample proof of its willingness to cooperate with international factors in finding a peaceful and negotiated solution to the whole complex of issues constituting the "Yugoslav crisis" and it would like to reiterate its high appreciation of the efforts of the international community, especially where Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, to resolve the conflicts and all outstanding issues solely through negotiations and agreement between all the parties concerned. Within those efforts, support to all actions of a humanitarian nature which are aimed at the protection of human rights is by no means of less importance, given the ethnic, cultural, historical and emotional and other links of the Serbs, and their general concern for the fate

of their brethren in parts which have remained outside the territory of the FR Yugoslavia, it was not easy for the Federal Government to discontinue assistance to the people and authorities in those regions but it did so; the only aid it is giving is humanitarian. The public of the FR Yugoslavia has accepted that decision as wise and prudent but it cannot accept that the Serbs in those regions are, if not solely, then primarily, held responsible for all the brutalities committed there. Needless to say, those territories are outside the jurisdiction of the FR Yugoslavia but such statements and, regrettably, Mr. Mazowiecki's Report is no exception in that sense, certainly do not contribute to upgrading the protection of human rights. Just as facts must be established objectively, however distressing they may be, so must blame for brutalities be apportioned equitably among all perpetrators. Putting the blame all too easily on any of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina can only undermine general efforts to end violations of human rights in those territories.

The Federal Government supports the conclusions in Mr. Mazowiecki's second report under points a) - d) and is prepared to help their implementation, just as it is prepared itself to provide, regardless of its limited possibilities, humanitarian relief to all the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, irrespective of religion or nationality. To that end, and also with a view to facilitating the delivery of international aid to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslav Prime Minister Mr. Milan Panic has already earlier offered Yugoslav airports, means of transportation, free passage and all the necessary facilities for the transport of international aid, in particular to Sarajevo. The Federal Government on this occasion reiterates its willingness to that effect.

The Federal Government would like to refer to those sections of Mr. Mazowiecki's Report which deal with the situation in the FR Yugoslavia and, by pointing to the facts and to the concrete measures it has taken in Kosovo and Metohija, in Vojvodina, and in those parts of the country designated as "Sanjak", draw attention to a number of inaccuracies in the report not reflecting the true state of affairs.

II. With regard to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija:

First of all, it is a fact that for a long time there has been no direct dialogue between the authorities and the Yugoslav Albanians in this province. In coordination with the authorities of the Republic of Serbia the Federal Government of Yugoslavia has taken steps and initiated a dialogue, not only within the framework of the Geneva Conference, but also in direct contact, - when Prime Minister M. Panic visited Kosovo and Metohija.

The Federal Government hopes that the process embarked upon by talks on the creation of conditions for the normal operation of elementary and secondary schools as well as of the university, will contribute to the building of confidence, the consistent observance of human and minority rights and the improvement of the position of all the inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohija. The basic prerequisite for that is the readiness of the Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija to accept reality in terms of the impossibility of changes of borders and of the state - legal status of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

It is not disputable that the Albanians are today unproportionately represented in public services, the administration, the judiciary and health, but it is incorrect to claim, as Mr. Mazowiecki's Report does, that they have been "completely eliminated" from those state services. Thus, of the 284 employed in the provincial state administration bodies, 90 are Albanians. Of the 206 employed in the Kosovo district administrative agencies, 27 are Albanians. The health services of Kosovo and Metohija employ 11,980, of which 8,498 Albanians. 212 Albanians are employed in the mass media. Of the 756 workers in the work communities of the courts, 351 are Albanians. Of the 166 holders of judicial offices, 15 are Albanians, while 26 elected judges have refused to take the oath. In public prosecutor's offices, of the 64 employed, 30 are Albanians.

The Federal Government and the Government of the Republic of Serbia are exerting efforts so as to change the situation, but for that to happen the Albanians themselves must demonstrate readiness to join those services. Namely, in examining the causes underlying this situation one should, inter alia, bear in mind the fact that the withdrawal of Albanians from a number of posts, primarily in the state administration, was resorted to by the Albanian political leadership as a means for attaining their political aim. Hence, one cannot only speak of the elimination of Albanians from public services but equally of their boycott of those services.

In the view of the Federal Government there is no proof for the claim about the planned "erosion of Albanian culture". Today the Kosmet Albanians print and distribute without any hindrance whatsoever some 20 papers and magazines and have daily TV and radio programmes in their language. In 1991 40 books with a circulation of over 3,000,000 copies were published in the Albanian language. During the 1990/1991 school year in Kosovo and Metohija there were 25,000 students of Albanian nationality i.e. 230 students per 10,000 inhabitants (160 in Serbia, 165 in France and 180 in Germany). This situation later changed, for well-known reasons. The Albanians have two theatres. In 1991 Albanian actors had 47 performances in the theatre. Of a total of 124 workers in those

theatres 84 are Albanians. In Kosovo and Metohija there are large and smaller libraries richly stocked with books in the Albanian language, there are many cultural and artistic societies, etc.

The Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija enjoy full freedom of religion. In Kosovo and Metohija there are over 500 mosques and in Pristina there is a religious school (a medresa) in which over 250 Albanians receive their education.

The Albanians have ten registered political parties which are, inter alia, pursuing their political activity also in international relations without any hindrance whatsoever.

III. In respect of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina:

The impression one has from the report of Mr. Mazowiecki is that the Special Rapporteur puts an equation mark between the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and the one in Vojvodina, which is absolutely not true. First of all, no special or legal measures have ever been undertaken in this province, nor are they in force today, which in itself testifies to the fact that the situation in the two provinces cannot be put into the same basket.

Nobody in Yugoslavia denies the fact that due to the war situation - the armed conflict in Croatia took place in the immediate vicinity of Vojvodina - and due to a large inflow of refugees from Croatia into this province, inter-ethnic relations in some places in Vojvodina were seriously disturbed. Some refugees many of whose closest relatives had been killed in the war and who, as a rule, had lost everything they once had, demonstrated a certain degree of intolerance, sometimes violent, against members of other ethnic groups (primarily Croats), seeking sometimes, even by force, to provide new homes and means of livelihood for themselves. As mentioned above, the authorities responded to such cases of violence; acts of extremists were most sharply condemned, and those who violated the law were arrested and charges were pressed against them. In the report of October 30, this year, submitted by the Federal Government to the Committee for Human Rights, in accordance with the provisions of article 40, item 1b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, all the cases and measures taken by the government to put an end to such a situation were covered in detail. On the other hand, wishing to avoid being mobilized during the armed conflict in Croatia, a number of members of ethnic minorities, as well as Serbs, temporarily fled the country. The amnesty law that is being prepared as already noted, should enable the return of these people whose families, after all, remained in the country. Furthermore, it is also true that a number of Croatian families moved to Croatia at the time of the conflict in Croatia or immediately after its termination. However, the statement of the Special Rapporteur "... that 90 000 Croats and Hungarians had fled" does not correspond to the facts.

Furthermore, even the Yugoslav authorities themselves do not have precise data on the exact number of refugees in the FR Yugoslavia. It is estimated that there are about 500,000 - 600,000 refugees and the vast majority of them have found only temporary shelter in certain regions, so that to claim that the "about 150 000 refugees", who are, according to the estimates of the Special Rapporteur, now in Vojvodina, will remain there permanently, is simply not true. From the context of point 22 of the Report it can be concluded that the "apprehensions of Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks, etc." are founded, since their property will allegedly "be confiscated" in order to accommodate refugees in their homes. In the FR Yugoslavia no one's property has been "confiscated", nor is there any such possibility, since private property is guaranteed by law. In addition, the Government of the FR Yugoslavia is advocating the return of all refugees to their homes, which coincides with the intentions of all the negotiating parties at the Geneva Conference. It is underlined in this statement, that the presence of such a large number of refugees presents a great problem for the Government of the FR Yugoslavia, and that this problem is not only affecting members of national minorities, but also all citizens of the FR Yugoslavia, and in financial terms, even more the families of majority ethnic groups than ethnic minority families.

To neglect all that the Government of the FR Yugoslavia, together with the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the Republic of Montenegro has done to ease ethnic tensions, and to ignore the fact that a dialogue with the minorities' representatives is being conducted, and in the presence of representatives of the Geneva Conference on Yugoslavia and CSCE missions, and all this with a view to resolving certain real problems, and to conclude that in the province of Vojvodina "... the overall situation is tense and that it seems(?) that there is a risk(?) of escalation of violence in the winter months" as stated at the end of Point 22 of the Report, testifies to the one-sided drawing of conclusions.

IV. With respect to the region designated as "Sandjak" in the Report:

It should be underlined that Sandjak, unlike the provinces of Kosovo and Metohija and Vojvodina, is merely a geographical and historical and not a state-legal term, consisting of six communes in Serbia and two in Montenegro, inhabited by a mixed population of Serbs, Montenegrins and Moslems, and that a "potential hot-bed of conflict" can be used to describe only those communes which border on Bosnia-Herzegovina (Plevlja, Prijepolje and Priboj). However, bearing in mind the measures undertaken by the federal authorities and the authorities of the two republics, particularly in Pljevlja and in the vicinity of Priboj, such a description - even in the case of the specified communes - is much less dramatic. The truth in fact is quite the opposite, i.e. that thanks to the resolute steps taken by the authorities in those communes, tensions have eased. What the authorities did was to take action against the perpetrators of terrorist acts of violence (planting of explosives, throwing hand grenades into yards, etc.) and to disarm the persons suspected of belonging to disbanded and outlawed paramilitary organizations. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against those persons, they have been apprehended, since the identity of most of the perpetrators of those acts has been discovered. It is also true that a number of reservists of the Army of Yugoslavia, mostly in a state of intoxication, had caused a number of incidents against Moslems but it cannot be concluded from this, as is done in Mr. Mazowiecki's Report, that the "positions of the Army" and the "Serbian authorities" were a potential source of "conflict". On the contrary, the Army of Yugoslavia has taken firm steps against its disorderly members. Likewise the local authorities which are also part of the system of the authorities of the Republic of Serbia, are rightly said in the report, to be acting in the direction of the strengthening of tolerance. In the border-line communes, the proximity of the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina does indeed heighten insecurity but not only of the Moslem population but also of the Serb and Montenegrin populations. By way of an example, let us mention that about one hundred Serbs and Montenegrins have moved out of the predominantly Moslem town of Rozaj. Precisely for the same reasons, a number of Moslems from this whole region, have moved to Macedonia, Turkey or Germany. However, claim that their number is as high as 70 000 is further evidence of the off-handed attitude towards quite unverified information. Finally, not only are the references to the destruction of mosques in Pljevlja, Priboj and Prijepolje untrue, but not a single mosque on the territory of the FR Yugoslavia has been demolished or burnt down. To speak in general terms of the danger of "a potential conflict in Sandjak" is simply unwarranted since, for instance, the situation in Tutin, Sjenica or Novi Pazar (for which the Special Rapporteur himself says that an "atmosphere of tolerance reigns") is completely different, i.e. peaceful.

In presenting its comments and objections to the report of Mr. Mazowiecki, the Federal Government is not in any way calling in question the good faith of the Special Rapporteur or the team of eminent experts on his mission, nor the intention of the mission to be impartial in portraying the situation. The Government merely wishes to draw attention to the problems resulting from conclusions based on an incompletely established state of affairs. Imprecision and conclusions drawn on the basis of, superficial impressions, provoke among public opinion in the FR Yugoslavia the feeling that this as well as other international missions are not impartial or rather that their reports are drafted in an off-handed manner, hastily, one-sidedly and without any in-depth study of the actual situation. The Government of the FR Yugoslavia looks upon the mission of Special Rapporteur Mr. Mazowiecki, as upon other missions of this kind, such as those sent by the CSCE, primarily as assistance to the FR Yugoslavia to remove as soon as possible, on the basis of such reports, any shortcomings identified with respect to the implementation of human rights. Consequently, the Yugoslav authorities, at the federal level, as well as at the level of the federal states, are wholeheartedly committed to providing all the necessary facilities to missions of this kind precisely in order that they may establish the real state of affairs with the greatest possible measure of accuracy and precision. And all this because they are deeply convinced that it is in the interest of the state of Yugoslavia, as well as of all its citizens, but also in the general interest of the international community, for human rights' protection to be raised to the highest level so that it might come up to the standards generally accepted in the world as soon as possible. Naturally, it is not trying to evade its international responsibilities should any failures to fulfil accepted international obligations be established. However, imprecision or inaccuracy or conclusions jumped to in haste can only erode the pursuit of that general interest - the real and effective protection of human rights, without any discrimination.



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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda items 30 and 35
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Report of the Secretary-General

1. The present report is submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/75 of 11 December 1991 on the question of convening an International Peace Conference on the Middle East. The operative part of the resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Reaffirms the urgent need to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the core of which is the question of Palestine;

"2. Considers that the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, on an equal footing, and the five permanent members of the Security Council, based on Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the right to self-determination, would contribute to the promotion of peace in the region;

"3. Reaffirms the following principles for the achievement of comprehensive peace:

"(a) The withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and from the other occupied Arab territories;

"(b) Guaranteeing arrangements for security of all States in the region, including those named in resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, within secure and internationally recognized boundaries;

"(c) Resolving the problem of the Palestine refugees in conformity with General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, and subsequent relevant resolutions;

"(d) Dismantling the Israeli settlements in the territories occupied since 1967;

"(e) Guaranteeing freedom of access to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites;

"4. Welcomes the convening at Madrid, on 30 October 1991, of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, which constitutes a significant step towards the establishment of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region;

"5. Notes the expressed desire and endeavours to place the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, under the supervision of the United Nations for a transitional period, as part of the peace process;

"6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts with the parties concerned, and in consultation with the Security Council, for the promotion of peace in the region, and to submit progress reports on developments in this matter."

2. On 28 October 1992, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of the request contained in paragraph 6 of the above-mentioned resolution, addressed the following letter to the President of the Security Council:

"I have the honour to refer to resolution 46/75 entitled 'International Peace Conference on the Middle East', which the General Assembly adopted at its forty-sixth session, on 11 December 1991, and the text of which is attached.

"Paragraph 6 of the resolution requests me to continue my efforts with the parties concerned, and in consultation with the Security Council, for the promotion of peace in the region, and to submit progress reports on developments in this matter. I should be grateful if the Security Council would convey to me its views as soon as possible."

3. As at 20 November 1992, no reply has been received from the Security Council.

4. In a note verbale to the parties concerned, dated 13 October 1992, the Secretary-General sought the positions of the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and of the Palestine Liberation

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Organization, in regard to the International Peace Conference on the Middle East as called for in General Assembly resolution 46/75. As at 20 November 1992, the following replies had been received:

Note dated 9 November 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations

"The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to his note verbale dated 13 October 1992 regarding General Assembly resolution 46/75 of 11 December 1991 entitled 'International Peace Conference on the Middle East'.

"Israel has consistently voted against General Assembly resolutions that called for the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East.

"Israel has long advocated direct negotiations as the only framework to advance peace in the Middle East. General Assembly resolution 46/75 proposes an International Peace Conference that is designed to serve as a substitute for direct negotiations. Characteristically, the verb 'negotiate' or any of its derivatives, are not to be found in the resolution.

"Israel is currently engaged in direct, face-to-face negotiations with its neighbours in bilateral and multilateral frameworks. Indeed, the United Nations itself is now a participant in the multilateral talks. Thus, in calling for an International Peace Conference, resolution 46/75 is clearly detached from reality and anachronistic. Support for this resolution only exemplifies inattentiveness to the positive political developments taking place outside the halls of the United Nations.

"Resolution 46/75 calls for the participation in the international conference of the PLO, a terrorist organization which cannot be considered a partner to peace negotiations.

"Moreover, resolution 46/75, while including a reference to Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), also affirms in operative paragraph 3 a series of principles which prejudge the possible outcome of peace negotiations and the very principles contained in Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

"In addition, the resolution contains inherent inconsistencies. On the one hand, resolution 46/75 welcomes the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference, which initiated the current peace process. On the other hand, resolution 46/75 reaffirms principles, such as those in operative paragraph 3, which stand in opposition to any genuine notion of peace. Thus, resolution 46/75 clearly contradicts itself."

Note dated 16 November 1992 from the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations

"Lebanon,

"In conformity with its commitment to Arab causes, and particularly to the cause of the Palestinian people, including the right of that people to achieve self-determination and to return to its land, to the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories and to the establishment of a just peace in the region,

"Pursuant to the general Arab position concerning the convening of an International Peace Conference, having regard to the fact that a large number of Palestinians are residing in Lebanese territory, and bearing in mind the fact that Lebanese territory was occupied by Israel in and subsequent to 1978 and that such occupation was due to be terminated under the terms of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), a resolution which was the subject of international consensus, demanding nothing short of implementation in full,

"In conformity with Lebanon's commitment to international law and to the institutions and principles on which such law and the decisions taken thereunder are based, and in particular to the rejection of any violation of any State's territorial integrity and full exercise of sovereignty over such territory, and in affirmation of Lebanon's determination to resolve the Lebanese occupation problem separately from the Middle East problem,

"Has decided to establish the following principles:

"1. It supports efforts to convene the International Conference with a view to resolving the Middle East problem and to establishing a comprehensive, just peace in the region;

"2. It agrees in principle to attend the Conference and to affirm that Lebanon, while having an interest in the cause of peace in the region, in the right of the Palestinian people to achieve self-determination in its national territory and in the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories, is primarily interested in the liberation of all its territory;

"3. Lebanon's attendance of the International Conference must in no way be taken as implying a link between a resolution of its problem and a resolution of the Middle East problem;

"4. It categorically rejects any attempt to settle the Palestinians in Lebanese territory;

"5. The problem posed by Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory must be solved through implementation of Security Council resolution

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425 (1978), which calls for an unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces from Lebanese territory to internationally recognized boundaries and urges assistance to the Government of Lebanon in exercising its full and effective authority throughout Lebanese territory;

"6. It stresses implementation of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement and adherence to all its provisions.

"Lebanon's participation in the current peace talks in Washington comes in response to the letter of invitation addressed to it by the Conference's sponsors and in accordance with the letter of assurances to it from the United States of America, which states the need for full implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) on a basis of strict respect for Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized boundaries.

"Lebanon wishes to affirm the need for United Nations involvement in the peace process and for the Organization's assumption of a greater, more effective and more participatory role in that process.

"The procrastination and debilitating conditions stipulated by Israel from time to time, and particularly its unwillingness to state its agreement to implement Security Council resolution 425 (1978) with Lebanon, serve only to delay and impede the present peace process.

"Lebanon believes it is essential to make tangible progress in the bilateral talks, which lie at the heart of the process; these address the political issue which, as is well known, without any doubt constitutes the basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict."

Note dated 19 November 1992 from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations

"In considering General Assembly resolution 46/75 of 11 December 1991, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic notes with regret that the principles affirmed by the General Assembly with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East region have not yet been realized for the following reasons:

"1. The refusal of Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories which it occupied in 1967, including the Syrian Golan and Jerusalem;

"2. Israel persistently continues to establish settlements in all the Arab territories occupied since 1967;

"3. The Israeli occupation authorities in the occupied Arab territories have failed to halt their repressive and arbitrary practices against the population in the occupied Arab territories;

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"4. Contrary to the wish of the General Assembly set forth in General Assembly resolution 38/58 C, Israel continues to hinder international efforts aimed at bringing a just and comprehensive peace to the Middle East region by the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East.

"By contrast, the Syrian Arab Republic has endeavoured to continue its sincere efforts aimed at establishing a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East region based on the implementation of United Nations resolutions, particularly Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). Accordingly, it responded to the initiative of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by participating in the Madrid Peace Conference and resolutely working in a responsible manner to ensure its success.

"The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the General Assembly should reaffirm the need for continued international efforts to achieve a just and comprehensive peace based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and United Nations resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict in such a way as to secure Israel's full withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and guarantee the national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

"Syria wishes to draw attention to the fact that its agreement to the above-mentioned United States proposals does not - in the event of the parties failing to reach agreement - affect its commitment to the United Nations resolution which calls for the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East, or to any other United Nations resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Palestine."

Note dated 3 November 1992 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

"The Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations presents his compliments to His Excellency, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and has the honour to refer to his note verbale, dated 13 October 1992, regarding General Assembly resolution 46/75, entitled 'International Peace Conference on the Middle East', and seeks to convey the position of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which retains the power and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of Palestine, on this matter.

"The Palestine Liberation Organization notes that the idea of convening an International Peace Conference in accordance with General Assembly resolutions, the latest of which was resolution 46/75, has received support from the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations. The Palestine Liberation Organization still believes that this idea represents the best and most effective way to achieve

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peace in the Middle East and regrets that such a conference has not yet materialized due to the disagreement of two parties. On the other hand, it is known that a peace process under the sponsorship of the United States of America and the Russian Federation is currently under way. The Palestine Liberation Organization supported the process and authorized Palestinian participation in it. Unfortunately, a full year has elapsed since the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference without the achievement of any tangible results.

"The Palestine Liberation Organization still supports the current peace process and hopes that it will effectively lead to a comprehensive peace in the region. Concurrently, it calls for a more active United Nations role in the process as well as in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem. The Palestine Liberation Organization also believes that the principles for the realization of a comprehensive peace, reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 46/75, remain valid, and asserts that any final settlement must embody these principles. Furthermore, the Palestine Liberation Organization believes that due to the complexity and interrelatedness of issues pertaining to the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East, an International Peace Conference in accordance with General Assembly resolutions must, at a certain stage, be convened.

"The Palestine Liberation Organization reaffirms in principle the lasting responsibility of the United Nations vis-à-vis the question of Palestine, until it is resolved in all its aspects, as well as the responsibility of the United Nations towards the building of a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East."

Observations

5. It is clear from the communications set out above that sufficient agreement does not exist to permit the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East as outlined in paragraph 2 of resolution 46/75.

6. Furthermore, it is important to note that the negotiations launched at the Madrid Peace Conference - which itself was welcomed in resolution 46/75 as a significant step towards the establishment of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region - have continued throughout the past year. The process has recently been widened to include the United Nations as a full participant in the multilateral working groups on regional issues. On 20 November 1992, I appointed Ambassador Chinmaya Gharekhan of India as my Special Representative to the multilateral talks.



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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At its 3141st meeting, on 25 November 1992, following the adoption of resolution 790 (1992), the President of the Security Council made the following statement:

"In connection with the resolution just adopted on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, I have been authorized to make the following complementary statement on behalf of the Security Council:

"As is known, the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/24821) states, in paragraph 20: 'Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached.' That statement of the Secretary-General reflects the view of the Security Council."



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LETTER DATED 24 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Please find herewith enclosed the text, in English and in French, of the Declaration on Former Yugoslavia issued on the occasion of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union, which took place in Rome on 20 November 1992.

I would be grateful if it could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vieri TRAXLER
Ambassador

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Declaration on Former Yugoslavia issued by the Council of
Ministers of the Western European Union at the meeting
held in Rome on 20 November 1992

Ministers discussed the extremely grave situation in former Yugoslavia and in particular the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They expressed dismay at continuing acts of aggression and violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the unacceptable practice of "ethnic cleansing", as well as at the repeated gross violations of human rights. They condemned all forms of obstruction of humanitarian operations. They called on all parties to respect the principles and decisions agreed at the London Conference and to work with the United Nations and the European Community (EC) special envoys to seek a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the problems of former Yugoslavia.

They reaffirmed the need for strict compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and stressed that violations of those resolutions would call for consideration of further measures by the Security Council.

They also reaffirmed their determination to reinforce the contribution of the Western European Union (WEU) and its member States were making in support of the efforts of the whole international community to bring peace to former Yugoslavia and to relieve the suffering of its peoples. In this regard, they noted that, since 16 July 1992, warships and aircraft of WEU member States, under Italian operational control, have been carrying out operations to monitor at sea compliance with the embargo established by United Nations Security Council resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992). So far 3,649 ships have been monitored by WEU operations and 71 suspected violations have been reported.

Ministers therefore welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 787 (1992). They decided that WEU will contribute to its implementation and that, to this end, warships and aircraft of WEU member States, on the basis of approved joint planning, will start operations aimed at ensuring the strict implementation of the embargo at sea. These will include stop-and-search actions and other measures as necessary. The participation of the member States will be subject to the provisions of their national constitutions.

WEU operations in the Adriatic have been undertaken and will continue to be carried out in close coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. WEU will continue to ensure that the two organizations work closely together.

WEU member States emphasized the importance of the sanctions assistance missions to which they contribute as members of the EC. They appealed to the Danube riparian States to ensure the strict application of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and confirmed that they were prepared to offer, if requested, expertise, technical assistance and equipment to those States to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking sanctions. They also affirmed their willingness to make similar contributions to the implementation of the control of the land embargo at the frontiers.

WEU member States are contributing in a variety of ways to the enhanced operations of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are now beginning their task of ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance. They reaffirmed the collective determination of WEU member States to contribute to the protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the responsibility of the United Nations and to offer further support to these operations. The member States of WEU are also prepared to study the possibility of and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes.



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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 743 (1992)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and all subsequent resolutions dealing with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Its purpose is to provide the Council with updated information on the progress made by UNPROFOR in the implementation of the mandate entrusted to it, mainly in Croatia, under the United Nations peace-keeping plan (S/23280, annex III) and by subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to the Force's activities in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The report brings to the Council's attention developments since the submission of a previous report on these matters on 28 September 1992 (S/24600). It contains information available to the Secretariat up to 0900 hours New York time on 20 November 1992.

I. DEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR

2. Since my report of 28 September 1992, UNPROFOR has deployed further personnel in order to implement additional mandates conferred by the Security Council, as follows:

(a) Into Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with resolution 776 (1992), to provide protective support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in that republic, as set out in my report to the Council of 10 September 1992 (S/24540);

(b) Into the Prevlaka area of Croatia, in accordance with resolution 779 (1992), to perform monitoring functions in that area as set out in my report to the Council of 28 September 1992;

(c) Into Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY), to perform functions at airfields in accordance with resolution 781 (1992) as outlined in my report to the Council of 5 November 1992 (S/24767) and endorsed in Security Council resolution 786 (1992);

(d) To the Peruca dam, situated in one of the "pink zones" in Croatia adjacent to Sector South of the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), to perform functions there in accordance with my report of 28 September 1992 as approved by the Council in resolution 779 (1992).

3. On 30 September, I announced the appointment of Mr. Cedric Thornberry as Deputy Chief of Mission of UNPROFOR. He will continue to serve as the mission's Director of Civil Affairs while also being deputy to the Force Commander, Lt.-Gen. Satish Nambiar (India). I further announced that Major-General Philippe Morillon (France), who had been Deputy Force Commander of UNPROFOR since its inception, would take command of the expanded UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the overall command of General Nambiar, and that Major-General Robert Gaudreau (Canada) would replace General Morillon as Deputy Force Commander of UNPROFOR. These appointments came into effect on 15 October 1992.
4. The deployment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command (BHC) of UNPROFOR has proceeded throughout much of the reporting period, as described in detail in paragraphs 30 to 35 below.
5. Eleven United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), together with European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) personnel, are deployed in the Dubrovnik-Prevlaka area.
6. A further 34 UNMOs have been deployed at airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY, in implementation of resolution 786 (1992), as reported to the Council in my letter of 13 November 1992 (S/24810) and they will shortly be replaced by 75 newly deployed UNMOs. This deployment was authorized in spite of difficulties over the financial arrangements. I took the view that the monitoring of the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina was an activity arising from the London session of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) and, as such, should be financed by the States contributing the military personnel required. Regrettably, the other Co-Chairman of the Conference did not share this view and I therefore decided to include the cost of these activities in the budget for UNPROFOR which is currently being submitted to the General Assembly.
7. Some elements (amounting to approximately one company) of the Kenyan battalion are currently deployed at the Peruca dam and its immediate vicinity. The Force Commander has appointed Sector South's Sector Engineer to be interim manager of the dam and the coordinator of UNPROFOR control over it.
8. As a result of difficulties in obtaining the consent of the local Serb authorities, border control personnel have not yet been deployed to carry out immigration and customs functions on international borders which coincide with those of the UNPAs (see paras. 21 and 22 below).
9. Upon completion of the deployment of the above elements UNPROFOR will comprise over 22,000 personnel and will thus be the largest peace-keeping operation so far undertaken by the United Nations.

II. OPERATIONAL MATTERS: CROATIA

A. Violations of the cease-fire

10. Cease-fire violations with small arms and heavy machine-guns continue to occur in all the sectors, on the UNPA boundaries and in the "pink zones". These violations are increasing in frequency, particularly in Sector East and in the "pink zones" adjacent to Sector South. This has led to increased tension in these areas.

B. Demilitarization

11. As I reported on 28 September (S/24600), the first phases of demilitarization proceeded well, when the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) withdrew from the UNPAs and the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) were largely demobilized. But complete demilitarization of the UNPAs in accordance with the plan has been obstructed by the so-called "Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina" (hereinafter referred to as the "Knin authorities"). These authorities have replaced the JNA and the TDF with Serb militia forces under various guises, comprising former JNA and TDF soldiers as well as irregular elements. They may total 16,000 personnel or more and are equipped with armoured personnel carriers, mortars, machine-guns and other arms prohibited under the peace-keeping plan. They are sometimes claimed by the Knin authorities to be police, but UNPROFOR does not accept this; they are not trained or equipped as police, nor do they perform police functions. Instead, they are often deployed along the borders of the UNPAs and the edges of the "pink zones", serving as a paramilitary force in blatant violation of the plan. The Knin authorities continue to assert that these elements are needed to defend Serb-controlled areas from attack and infiltration by the Croatian Army (CA). As has been the case for several months, the CA has, in turn, maintained, or even re-established, some of its forces on the confrontation line. As a result, clashes, cease-fire violations and armed provocations continue to take place all along the line, raising tensions and provoking further militancy on both sides.

12. Despite many interventions at the highest level in Belgrade and/or with the various local authorities by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY, Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, by Under-Secretary-General Goulding, by the Force Commander and by senior UNPROFOR personnel, no progress has been achieved towards the demobilization of these elements. Promises have been given by Presidents Cosic and Milosevic, and by Prime Minister Panic, to use all their influence and authority to secure this demilitarization. But at the same time they have said that they exert no effective control over the Serb local authorities in the UNPAs. For their part, my representatives have insisted that the Security Council continue to hold the Belgrade authorities responsible for the implementation of the peace-keeping plan, to which they had earlier agreed. It seems evident that the Belgrade authorities could, if they so chose, take measures which would have a strongly persuasive effect upon the Serb local authorities, especially in view of the considerable economic dependence of much of the UNPAs upon the FRY.

13. Undertakings have also been given by the local authorities themselves; but these, too, have not been fulfilled. Indeed, there is some evidence that their "special milicijas" have actually been strengthened in recent weeks. In Sector East, for example, UNPROFOR estimates that armed elements now number at least 5,000. It is not entirely clear whether they are principally answerable to the authorities in Vukovar, in Knin or in Belgrade. In a letter addressed to General Nambiar and Mr. Thornberry on 10 November, Mr. Zdravko Zecevic, the so-called "President of the State Commission for Cooperation with UNPROFOR" of the Knin authorities, stated that the role of UNPROFOR military personnel is to ensure that the UNPAs remain demilitarized and that all the inhabitants in these areas be protected from the threat of armed attacks, and that, from their standpoint, this is the essence of the Vance plan. However, in view of Croatian cease-fire violations, the reasons for "a slower implementation of demilitarization are more than evident". To insist on demilitarization in such circumstances, as UNPROFOR was doing, would be to take away from the Serb people of the area their basic right to self-defence. Mr. Zecevic added that, unless UNPROFOR were to undertake all necessary measures to guarantee the protection of the Serbs and take more decisive attitudes in respect of Croatian cease-fire violations, it would be extremely difficult to continue the demilitarization process.

14. For its part, the Croatian Government, noting that UNPROFOR has neither the mandate nor the resources to resolve this situation by coercive means, has indicated its dissatisfaction and its desire to have the mandate reviewed. Members of the Croatian Government have also, from time to time, publicly asserted that they will re-establish Croatian control over the areas by unilateral means. Such statements invariably have very destabilizing effects within the UNPAs. In a letter of 11 November 1992 responding to a letter from the Force Commander seeking his cooperation in preventing violations of the plan, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the FRY, Mr. Milan Panic, referred to "frequent violations of the agreement by the forces of the Republic of Croatia, and especially their threats that they will ensure, by means of force, the return of refugees of Croatian nationality to Sector East prior to the achievement of the final political solution". He urged UNPROFOR to exert influence on the Croatian authorities "to observe the agreements reached". UNPROFOR is thus faced with the apparent inability of the Federal Government in Belgrade to help, with obstruction by the Serb local authorities in the UNPAs, with strong statements and actions by the Croatian side, and with stepped-up counter-measures (including mobilizations) by the local authorities. It is thus continually thwarted in its efforts to fulfil the plan, whose viability will remain in doubt unless the various local authorities extend the necessary cooperation to it.

C. Acts of terrorism

15. Sector West, which is partly under Croatian and partly under Serb control, is the only sector where full demilitarization has taken place. It continues to be relatively calm, though acts of ethnically motivated terrorism continue there. In the other three sectors, however, daily police reports

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describe murders, the burning and demolition of houses, the destruction of churches, the killing of cattle and other domestic animals, armed robberies and assaults, all of which crimes are usually aimed at members of national minorities. Because, in some areas, few minority members other than the very old have remained, an especially distressing feature is the number of armed attacks on the homes and property of very old women. They are often committed by groups of uniformed men, sometimes masked, carrying automatic weapons. In some parts of Sector South, United Nations civilian police (UNCIVPOL) reports that terror has become so prevalent that inhabitants are sleeping in woods or under trees, away from their homes. Perhaps the only positive development in recent weeks has been a decline in the number of murders, and, in Sector East, of other forms of grossly coercive conduct aimed at "ethnic cleansing". Most areas of UNPROFOR deployment are Serb-controlled and there the vast majority of these crimes are perpetrated against Croats. But acts of intimidation have also continued, though with somewhat diminishing frequency, against Serbs in the Croatian-controlled part of Sector West.

16. The local civil police in Serb-controlled areas of the UNPAs seem virtually powerless, and the system of law enforcement has substantially disintegrated. UNCIVPOL, of course, does not have law-enforcement powers, its basic role being limited to monitoring the activities of the local police. These include many thoroughly professional, fully trained police officers, who on several occasions have told UNCIVPOL of their frustration at the current situation. Indeed, some have pointed out that the "special milicija's" intimidation is aimed not only at the remaining Croats but also at themselves and at "moderate-minded" Serbs. Neither the military component of UNPROFOR, nor UNCIVPOL, with their slim resources, were established to restore law and order; nor were they given any such mandate. However, the trend amongst the local population has increasingly been to treat UNCIVPOL as the legitimate source of authority, and confidence in them has continued to grow in all sections of the community, despite their lack of executive authority.

D. Return of refugees and displaced persons

17. In three of the four sectors, no discernible return has begun, even though the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of origin lies at the heart of the peace-keeping plan. This has been a source of great concern, not only to the individuals concerned, but also to UNPROFOR, which has been obliged on many occasions to state that conditions are not yet appropriate for such return to take place. The lead role in the envisaged process is conferred upon the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has worked with UNPROFOR, the Croatian Government and the local authorities to facilitate such return. However, as indicated above, the security which is necessary for return does not exist in Sectors East, North and South. A quadripartite mechanism has been established under the auspices of the ICFY to facilitate the process of return but, as I stated in my report of 28 September (S/24600), the first essential step towards general return is progress towards the disarming and demobilizing of the "special milicija".

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18. This thesis is confirmed by UNPROFOR's efforts in Sector West, where the programme for displaced persons to visit their villages and former homes has accelerated with the cooperation of the two sets of local authorities. To date, nearly 2,000 people have been able to travel, under UNPROFOR protection, to their former homes in more than 50 villages, and a step-by-step rebuilding of confidence amongst present and former inhabitants is well under way. UNPROFOR has benefited from the cooperation of the United Nations Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs in Vienna, under a community development project financed by the United Nations Development Programme. In some areas, reconstruction of damaged homes can soon begin and, in this connection, the Austrian Government has generously offered to provide 500 units of temporary housing for individuals engaged in this difficult and delicate process. For the return process to continue, it is also necessary to rebuild infrastructure in these areas. Water, electricity and other services have been seriously damaged in the recent conflict and international assistance will be essential for their restoration.

19. Extremist elements on both sides are nevertheless still present in Sector West. The Croatian police have often played an intimidatory role which has been vigorously protested by UNPROFOR. Where, however, local authorities see it in their interest to cooperate with UNPROFOR, even on such a complex question as the return of displaced persons, and are supported by the central Government, a great deal can be achieved, with the extremist fringe being isolated and rendered relatively powerless. It should be added, however, that few people have yet effected a permanent return, even under these relatively benign conditions, and it is still too early to say authoritatively how successful the Sector West return programme will be. In this connection, on 14 November, after visits to the sector by General Radko Mladic, Commander of Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by Mr. Milan Martić, "Interior Minister" of the Knin authorities, the UNPROFOR Sector Commander was told by the Knin authorities of their intention to return the situation in Sector West to conditions resembling those elsewhere in the UNPAs. Of late the visitation programme has slowed because of expressed fears by inhabitants that it contributes to tension and violence.

20. Mention has been made, above, of the destructive role that can be played by extremists in the complex process of returning people to their villages and homes, quite soon after the end of a tragic conflict. Such extremists feed upon one another's excesses, as has been observed by UNPROFOR on several occasions since my last report on 28 September (S/24600). In each instance, the initiative has come from certain Croatian political leaders. Croatia, which is undergoing serious economic difficulties, has nevertheless absorbed several hundred thousand refugees and displaced persons. Understandably, these people want to return to their homes and leave the temporary facilities in which they have been living. Certain political leaders have sought to develop movements for return to the UNPAs within stated deadlines, and then to organize mass returns. UNPROFOR has emphasized at all levels that the basic conditions of security do not exist for such mass returns and that the highly publicized attempts made so far not only exacerbate tensions but, if persisted in, could lead to renewed tragedies. On one occasion, in the Osijek area on

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30 September, the situation was made worse by public statements by a senior officer that the Croatian Army would support such returns and move up behind the marching people. These events caused great tension in Sector East, which was the displaced persons' stated destination, and, indeed, fear among the Serb population in the sector (for fear, on both sides, is still a factor in the UNPAs). This, in turn, provided both reason and pretext for further mobilization of the Serb "special milicijas", and renewed victimization of non-Serb people. Finally, the situation was defused by UNPROFOR and the Croatian Government; but these events were deeply counter-productive, leading to the unravelling of much patient work in which UNPROFOR had been engaged for several months.

E. Border control

21. In my report of 27 July 1992 (S/24353), I described the need which had arisen, since the Security Council's approval of the peace-keeping plan, for UNPROFOR to control international crossing points along the boundaries of the UNPAs. On 7 August 1992 the Council endorsed my proposal for meeting this need (resolution 769 (1992)). Since that time, I have instituted a full professional study of the means and modalities required to carry out this complex process, which will be without precedent in United Nations operations, and have received a detailed report on the subject. This confirms that the project is technically viable and can, indeed, be carried out with fewer civilian resources than I had originally been advised might be required. This would have to be offset, however, by an increase in military resources of over 350 personnel. However, the implementation of the recommended approach has not so far proved possible since the Knin authorities have themselves placed controls and checkpoints at all major crossing points, including international crossings. It would be impossible for UNPROFOR to conduct such functions in a satisfactory and visibly independent manner if its positions were co-located with those of the Knin authorities.

22. In order to proceed with the implementation of Security Council resolution 769 (1992), the Force Commander requested the Knin authorities to dismantle their installations and remove them to locations 500 metres from those of UNPROFOR. On 2 November 1992, at a meeting in Knin, the so-called "President" of the "Serb Republic of Krajina", Mr. Goran Hadzic, told UNPROFOR that, while he accepted its proposal regarding "95 per cent" of the locations, he could not accept it as regards five bridges. On 4 November 1992, however, the Knin authorities wrote to General Nambiar, retracting this position and stating that they would not accept the withdrawal of any of their control points. They also cited the rights emanating from their supposed "sovereignty". General Nambiar will continue to discuss this question with the Knin authorities with a view to its resolution at the earliest opportunity. Their cooperation, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 769 (1992), is essential if UNPROFOR is to implement the Council's resolution, as the Force has neither the mandate nor the military resources to enforce it.

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F. Peruca dam

23. I described, in my report of 28 September 1992 (S/24600), the disturbing situation at the Peruca dam, which was believed to have been prepared for demolition at some time in the recent past. UNPROFOR took control of the dam on 14 September 1992 and monitors its condition daily. Two further inspections have taken place, by civil engineering consultants and by military explosives experts provided by a Member State, and these have somewhat reduced the level of alarm. However, the Knin authorities told the military experts that substantial quantities of explosives were indeed present; that they had diagrams; and that they were willing to remove the charges. On 7 November 1992 UNPROFOR formally requested such assistance, to be conducted under its supervision, as soon as possible. The Knin authorities have, however, failed to deliver copies of the demolition diagrams. On the basis of all reports available to it, UNPROFOR remains concerned about the situation at the dam. "Serb milicija" units remain some distance away but in the general vicinity of the installation, which continues to be guarded by UNPROFOR troops.

G. Joint Commission

24. In my report of 28 September 1992, I also described the setting up and functioning of the Joint Commission which, in accordance with Security Council resolution 762 (1992), comprises the Croatian Government, the Knin authorities, the ECMM, and UNPROFOR, whose Deputy Chief of Mission chairs the meetings. The Commission held its eighth meeting on 9 November. Though two subcommissions which it has established, to deal with security and cease-fire matters, and economic and humanitarian matters, respectively, have met intermittently, and have, at the technical level, prepared the ground for further progress, the work of the Commission has been effectively stalled by a lack of political will to move forward. At the conclusion of the eighth meeting, it was decided to afford the parties some pause for reflection before convening any further meeting. No new meeting of the Joint Commission was therefore scheduled, although it was agreed that the subcommissions would continue their work and report thereon to the Chairman.

25. Although the Joint Commission has identified a number of important areas in which normalization of relations between the two communities can and should take place, there has been little or no progress towards the achievement of its basic objective, namely, that of overseeing and monitoring, in various fields, the restoration of the Croatian Government's authority in the "pink zones". Meanwhile, UNPROFOR's presence in the "pink zones" has helped to stabilize the situation there to some degree, although on the one side acts of terrorism continue, and, on the other, cease-fire violations and provocations are frequent. Resolution 762 (1992) marked a compromise between the two sides, and helped defuse a situation which, at the time, seriously jeopardized the cease-fire. Its implementation, however, remains incomplete, with the risk that a new crisis could soon occur.

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E. The Prevlaka peninsula

26. On 23 and 24 September 1992, the Chief Military Observer of UNPROFOR held discussions with the local commanders of the Croatian and Yugoslav armies on the modalities of the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from the Municipality of Dubrovnik. The discussions were based on the concept of establishing a demilitarized zone on either side of the Croatian/Montenegro border and envisaged a 12-day withdrawal phase. An agreement was endorsed by the Croatian Commander; however, the Yugoslav Commander was not authorized to endorse it. Copies of the proposed agreement were passed to the Croatian and Yugoslav authorities on 26 September 1992 and UNPROFOR continued from that time to press the parties for approval of the implementing agreement.

27. The Yugoslav Army withdrawal appears to have commenced about 8 October 1992 in the absence of any formal agreement between the parties. It was not until 20 October 1992, the date agreed for the completion of the withdrawal by President Tudjman and President Cosic in Geneva on 30 September 1992, that the parties sought to formalize security arrangements to follow the withdrawal. Boundaries for the United Nations demilitarized zone under resolution 779 (1992) were agreed on the night of 20 October 1992 by Presidents Cosic and Tudjman, meeting under the co-chairmanship of Mr. Vance and Lord Owen.

28. The withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army was successfully conducted in a professional manner. Unfortunately, elements from the Serb forces in eastern Herzegovina appear to have occupied Croatian territory in the wake of the Yugoslav Army withdrawal. Hostilities broke out between these Serb elements and the Croatian Army on 21 October 1992 when the Croatian Army attempted to move forward after the Yugoslav withdrawal. Fighting continued until 24 October 1992 when the local Croatian Commander advised UNPROFOR representatives that Serb forces had been expelled from Croatian territory. The fighting during this period spilled over into Bosnia and Herzegovina where, it is claimed by the Serb authorities, Croatian forces have occupied some 39 Serb villages. The Croatian authorities have stated that the Forces fighting in Herzegovina are Bosnian Croat (HVO) Forces and not those of the CA. In a letter dated 13 November 1992, the Prime Minister of the FRY, Mr. Milan Panic, advised me of the "justified fear and bitterness of the local population, which is demanding from the highest authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to post the Yugoslav Army units on their old positions in the interests of their security".

29. None the less, I advised the Council in my letter of 21 October 1992 (S/24710) that the Yugoslav Army had now completed its withdrawal from all Croatian territory in compliance with the plan approved by the Council, and UNPROFOR military observers were stationed on Prevlaka peninsula, where the United Nations flag was flying. Although a crucial element of the plan has thus been fulfilled, the events described in the preceding paragraph remain a cause for disquiet. In addition, the removal of a Croatian police checkpoint on the main access road inside the prohibited area and the cessation of Croatian mobile police patrols remain to be achieved.

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III. OPERATIONAL MATTERS: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A. Bosnia and Herzegovina Command

30. The Security Council, by its resolution 770 (1992) on 13 August 1992, called upon Member States to take nationally, or through regional agencies or arrangements, all measures necessary to facilitate, in coordination with UNPROFOR, the delivery by UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of this resolution, I proposed a concept of operation in my report (S/24540) of 10 September 1992 whereby this function would be added to UNPROFOR's mandate and carried out by military personnel under the command of the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, operating in accordance with the established principles and practices of United Nations peace-keeping operations. The concept of operations was approved by resolution 776 (1992) on 14 September 1992, by which UNPROFOR was tasked under its enlarged mandate to support UNHCR's efforts to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary.
31. To carry out this task, it was decided to establish within UNPROFOR a new Bosnia and Herzegovina Command (BHC), at the two-star level. BHC would consist of Sector Sarajevo, which would continue to perform the tasks arising from the 5 June 1992 airport agreement, as authorized by resolutions 758 (1992) and 761 (1992), and four new zones, the precise locations of which would be determined after reconnaissance of the terrain and further consultation with UNHCR. In each zone would be an infantry battalion group, possessing a high degree of self-sufficiency, which would be responsible for providing troops for protective support to UNHCR-organized convoys within that zone. Additionally, the need was identified for certain logistic and other support elements as well as for 80 UNMOs and 80 civilian staff members. It was also agreed that all additional resources for this extension of UNPROFOR's mandate would be provided at no cost to the United Nations and that the contributing countries, or other Member States, would cover, on a voluntary basis, the additional administrative expenses which would be incurred by the United Nations.
32. On 19 September 1992, a Joint Planning Team for BHC assembled at Zagreb, where senior military officers from the troop-contributing countries met with UNPROFOR and UNHCR officials to work out a tentative deployment for the infantry battalions and support units. Major-General Philippe Morillon, then Deputy Force Commander of UNPROFOR, who was nominated as commander of BHC, also attended the meetings. Thereafter, on the basis of the plan drawn up, advance parties of all the units began reconnaissance and liaison within their respective areas.
33. As a result of the reconnaissance, Kiseljak, a town some 20 kilometres to the north-west of Sarajevo, which provides access to most of the humanitarian convoy routes, was selected as the location for the BH Command headquarters. Staff officers and personnel for this headquarters, who started arriving at

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Belgrade on 6 October 1992, have moved to Kiseljak, where the headquarters is now established and fully functional. A tactical headquarters group has been set up under General Morillon at Sarajevo for close liaison with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

34. On 4 November 1992, the French battalion group completed its arrival in the area of Velika Kladusa in north-western Bosnia and assumed responsibility for the Velika Kladusa-Bihac area. The logistics base for this battalion is at Zagreb. The battalion has not so far been able to deploy into the Bosanski Petrovac area in accordance with its current plans, because of lack of agreement from the local authorities. The battalion group from Spain was initially slated for arrival by sea at Ploce and was to have deployed forward into Mostar in western Herzegovina. In spite of the Croatian Government's denial of suitable facilities and accommodation at Ploce, the battalion is attempting to deploy into the Mostar area. Company-sized elements are already located at Jablanica in eastern Herzegovina. The British battalion group which arrived at Split, its main logistics base, has started deploying forward into Vitez and Gornji Vakuf in central Bosnia and will provide protection for humanitarian convoys to towns there and around Tuzla in the east. Elements of the battalion are already involved in information-gathering about refugee movements in central Bosnia, after the fall of Jajce, and in providing convoy protection assistance to the extent possible. Additional support elements of the British contingent, in the form of engineer, logistics, workshop and medical units, will be based at Split, Tomislavgrad and Gornji Vakuf.

35. So far, however, advance elements of the Canadian battalion, which has arrived in Daruvar in Sector West, have not been able to carry out any reconnaissance in the Banja Luka area, as the Bosnian Serb authorities there have denied access to them. This battalion is therefore awaiting a positive outcome of the negotiations which are being conducted with the Bosnian Serb authorities so that they can deploy at an early date. The companies of the composite transport battalion from Belgium and the Netherlands have also arrived and two of them have been deployed near Vitez (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Pancevo (FRY). The deployment of the third company, which is to be located at Banja Luka (Bosnia and Herzegovina), is awaiting the outcome of negotiations by the Canadian battalion. Prior to this, the company may be temporarily redeployed from its present staging area in Pleso (Croatia) into Metkovic. As a result of the problems mentioned, the deployment of BH Command is now likely to be behind schedule. Only the battalion groups of Spain and the United Kingdom are now able to execute convoy protection in most parts of their originally assigned areas. The battalion group of France is able to protect convoys, but in a restricted area, rather than the area originally assigned during the Joint Planning meetings.

36. Although progress has thus been made in deploying BHC and the formed units under its control, the deployment to BHC of military observers and civil affairs personnel has been delayed by budgetary problems. These personnel are an essential complement to the formed units. The civilians, in particular, have an important role in providing the BHC Commander and his military staff with administrative services and advice on political, legal, information and

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administrative matters. This support is essential in order to help BHC headquarters ensure that the new Command's activities comply fully with the established principles and practices of United Nations peace-keeping, in accordance with the plan contained in my report of 10 September 1992 (S/24540), which was approved by the Security Council in resolution 776 (1992). The Member States which agreed to contribute military personnel, equipment and logistic support for BHC at no cost to the United Nations have been unwilling to accept that the common costs of BHC, which they have agreed to finance, should include the costs of the military observers and United Nations civilian personnel. As a result, it has not yet been possible to deploy adequate military observer and civilian support to BHC. In order to avoid further delay, I have decided to include provision for the necessary military observers and civilian personnel in the UNPROFOR budget which is currently being presented to the General Assembly. In the meantime, I have told General Nambiar that he should ensure that BHC is assisted with as much political, legal, information and administrative support as can be redeployed from the remainder of the mission, to the extent that this can be done without gravely dislocating the fulfilment of its tasks, and bearing in mind that UNPROFOR was already seriously short of civilian staff, even before this expansion of its mandate.

37. Throughout the reporting period, Sector Sarajevo has contrived to carry out its mandate of keeping open, and operating, Sarajevo airport and escorting convoys of relief supplies from the airport to the city. Convoys have also been escorted to more distant locations, especially Gorazde. A total of 1,619 humanitarian flights, carrying 19,669 metric tons of aid, have been flown into the airport. The sector also coordinated efforts to restore electricity, gas and water supplies in the city, with UNPROFOR personnel protecting civilian workers and completing many of the repairs themselves. UNPROFOR military observers continue to monitor the heavy weapons positions of the parties in the hills around Sarajevo. In addition, Sector Sarajevo has had to devote much effort to providing support to high-ranking delegations who have requested armed and armoured escort during visits to Sarajevo. As these requests can divert the sector's resources from its primary function of supporting UNHCR's efforts to deliver desperately needed humanitarian supplies, I have authorized the Force Commander to be somewhat restrictive in his response to them. I should like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the military, police and civilian personnel who have served with such courage and devotion to duty in Sarajevo, where UNPROFOR has suffered five soldiers killed by hostile action and 87 wounded.

38. On the basis of agreements reached with the three Bosnia and Herzegovina parties in Geneva, UNPROFOR has succeeded in setting up a Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG), which held its first meeting in Sarajevo on 23 October 1992. The MMWG is now chaired by the Chief of Staff of BHC and consists of representatives of the three parties (the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs). This is the first time that the parties have agreed to tripartite meetings in Sarajevo to address major issues of concern. The MMWG has held six meetings so far. Further meetings are to be held every three or four days. The subjects primarily addressed by

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the MMWG so far have been (a) demilitarization of parts or all of Sarajevo, (b) opening of routes within and to Sarajevo, and (c) establishment of a cease-fire in specified areas or all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the sixth meeting on 10 November 1992, the three sides agreed to and signed a cease-fire for all of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be effective at midnight 11/12 November 1992.

39. Although the establishment of the MMWG was itself a step forward, the negotiations have been slow and arduous. All the parties have declared their resolve to achieve results which could lead to a cessation of hostilities and facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid throughout the conflict area, but this declared resolve has not yet been translated into concrete agreements. So far, the three sides have mostly used the MMWG to state their points of view on various issues or to lay down conditions which are unacceptable to the other two sides. The cease-fire agreement of 10 November 1992 was a positive development in the circumstances, but it has already been violated by all parties on a large number of occasions. It remains to be seen whether they are really willing and able to implement such an agreement on the ground.

40. The challenge facing UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be underestimated. The frequent autumn rains, which have led to flooding and mobility problems, are now being followed by periods of falling temperatures. Snow has fallen on Sarajevo and on many mountain regions. Roads, bridges and railways have been without normal maintenance for nearly a year. Many have suffered major damage from the fighting. The result, even before the arrival of winter, is that road surfaces are collapsing and unsafe. Snow and ice will render many routes impassable. The implications for humanitarian operations of all kinds are severe.

B. Ban on military flights

41. On 30 September 1992, President Tudjman and President Cosic, meeting under the co-chairmanship of Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, agreed in principle to the deployment of observers at airfields in their respective republics for the purpose of monitoring the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was followed by the adoption of Security Council resolution 781 (1992) on 9 October 1992 and an offer by Dr. Karadzic, on 13 October 1992, to move military aircraft under his control from Banja Luka to the FRY. Attempts by UNPROFOR representatives to hold discussions on this movement with representatives of the Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb authorities were frustrated by an apparent lack of consensus within the Serb leadership on Dr. Karadzic's initiative. Finally, in discussions with Mr. Vance and Lord Owen on 28 October 1992, Dr. Karadzic withdrew his offer to fly out the aircraft. He advised instead that the aircraft would remain in their hangars at Banja Luka and would fly only as authorized by UNPROFOR. It was also agreed in principle that UNPROFOR observers would be allowed to monitor airfields under the control of the Serb authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Negotiations were held in Belgrade on 29 October 1992 and an implementing agreement, on monitoring of the airfields under the control of the Yugoslav authorities was

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signed on 2 November 1992. Discussions with the Croatian authorities on a similar agreement were successfully conducted on 27 and 31 October 1992 and signed on 1 November 1992. Agreements were signed on behalf of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency and on behalf of the Bosnian Serb side in Geneva on 3 November 1992.

42. To ensure speedy implementation of the agreements, notwithstanding the financial problem described in paragraph 6 above, military observers were deployed from existing United Nations observer missions during the period 28 to 30 October 1992 to begin monitoring of airfields. They will be replaced on or about 10 December 1992 by 75 military observers provided directly by contributing countries following the adoption of Security Council resolution 786 (1992) which authorized UNPROFOR's expansion for this purpose. The combination of reporting by observers at airfields and by UNPROFOR forces on or adjacent to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the provision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 781 (1992), of information obtained from technical monitoring of Bosnia and Herzegovina airspace, should permit the effective implementation of the monitoring aspects of Security Council resolution 781 (1992).

43. In my letters to the President of the Security Council of 6 November 1992 (S/24783), 13 November 1992 (S/24810) and 20 November 1992 (S/24840), I conveyed UNPROFOR's first reports, in accordance with resolution 781 (1992), on compliance with the resolution. The guidelines and procedures used by UNPROFOR in approving flights to Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed to the letter of 13 November 1992. Subsequent daily reports have shown a number of apparent infringements of the ban by aircraft which appear to be seeking to avoid radar detection.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

44. The situation in the UNPAs and "pink zones" has not improved since my report of 28 September (S/24600), in which I described the mounting lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR's efforts to put into effect the peace-keeping plan approved by the Council. Although neither side has fully implemented its undertakings, and each has been guilty of irresponsible and provocative conduct, the root cause of UNPROFOR's inability to make further progress has been the Knin authorities' growing and increasingly outspoken defiance of the Security Council and UNPROFOR. The Knin authorities' refusal to accept demilitarization of the UNPAs and the return of refugees and displaced persons undermined two of the fundamental principles of the peace-keeping plan approved by the Council. Particularly distressing is their apparent intention to establish in Sector West, where UNPROFOR had been making some progress, the conditions of brutal lawlessness which, despite all UNPROFOR's efforts, exist in Sectors East, North and South.

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45. Although the Croatian authorities have from time to time raised tension in the UNPA's and the "pink zones" by injudicious public statements and provocative military moves, it has to be stated clearly that responsibility for non-implementation of the peace-keeping plan approved by the Security Council rests squarely with the Knin authorities. It is they who have abused the law and order powers entrusted to the local authorities by the plan and, instead, created or perpetuated conditions of lawlessness and disorder. It is they who have exploited the presence of UNPROFOR and the resulting cessation of hostilities to assert their pretensions to sovereignty and statehood, instead of cooperating with UNPROFOR to create conditions in which a negotiated accommodation of their legitimate concerns could be achieved. It is they who have refused to withdraw their forces from the "pink zones" and have blocked full implementation of resolution 762 (1992) by pursuing the aim of consolidating the status quo in those areas rather than facilitating the orderly restoration of Croatian authority there.

46. The question thus arises of what further action can be taken to persuade the Knin authorities to honour the commitments arising from their previously declared acceptance of the peace-keeping plan (though some of their more recent statements have called the plan itself into question). It had appeared for a brief time that the improving climate of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb might make it possible to overcome the various obstacles in the way of effective implementation of the plan in the Sectors and the "pink zones". But this hope has not been fulfilled. Unless a way can quickly be found of obtaining the cooperation of the Knin authorities, the UNPROFOR operation in Croatia will confront the Security Council with the same dilemma as have other operations, notably the one in southern Lebanon, which have been prevented by the non-cooperation of one or more of the parties from fulfilling their original short-term mandate but have nevertheless succeeded in controlling the level of hostilities in their areas of deployment and alleviating the suffering of the civilian population. In such situations the Security Council has to make the difficult choice between withdrawing the operation, in the knowledge that this will be likely to lead to a resumption of fighting, or keeping it in place, in the knowledge that this may involve the Council in a large and expensive commitment for an indefinite period of time, without any certainty that the mandate of the operation will be fulfilled.

47. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also disquieting. A complicated and savage conflict continues to rage throughout the Republic, and large numbers of people remain vulnerable to starvation and displacement during an arduous winter whose rigours have only just begun. Security Council resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina remain largely unimplemented. The Croatian Army is reliably reported to be engaged extensively in the Republic, particularly in Herzegovina and in the Orasje area. Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina meanwhile continue to rely on logistical support from the FRY.

48. It must be noted, however, that UNPROFOR's mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more practicable than in Croatia. Part of it is to monitor the ban on military flights. It is already established that this is feasible.

The first four weeks of the ban have produced no confirmed evidence of combat activity, though they have shown that many flights of military aircraft, mostly helicopters, are taking place from Serb-controlled airfields and that unapproved flights are regularly taking place, mostly at night, from Croatia into government-controlled areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

49. The bulk of UNPROFOR's activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, is in support of efforts to relieve the suffering of the civilian population. Sector Sarajevo deserves great credit, as do the aircrew involved, for their dogged efforts to keep the Sarajevo airbridge open during the summer and autumn. Now, as winter sets in, the emphasis is shifting to land-delivered supplies. United Nations troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina are pioneering a new dimension of United Nations peace-keeping as they take on the task of protecting the delivery of humanitarian supplies. This does not, in my view, require a revision of the peace-keeping rules of engagement which, as I have reported previously, already entitle United Nations troops to use force if prevented by armed persons from carrying out their mandate. But in convoy protection duties, United Nations troops may have to move beyond the usual peace-keeping mode of impartiality between two parties to a conflict who have both agreed to the United Nations role. They themselves may become a party to a conflict with whoever tries to block, rob or destroy the convoy which they are protecting. I am watching carefully this aspect of the new operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and will keep the Security Council fully informed.

50. The financial arrangements agreed for the expansion of UNPROFOR under resolution 776 (1992) are also innovative. The addition to UNPROFOR of contingents financed and supported entirely by their national Governments has given rise to some teething troubles, especially as regards command and control. I have had to seek the help of the contributing Governments in ensuring that all concerned recognize that the new units are an integral part of UNPROFOR, under the overall command of the Force Commander, and that newly arrived troops wearing United Nations insignia pass under United Nations command as soon as they reach the mission area. Their subsequent activities must comply with UNPROFOR policy, as laid down by the Force Commander, in all operational, legal, information and administrative matters. The lack of budgetary provision for United Nations civilian personnel, including administrators and military observers, as described in paragraph 36 above, has deprived BHC of experienced United Nations personnel to guide it in these matters during its initial deployment. It is for this reason that I have decided to recommend to the General Assembly that BHC's requirements for civilian staff and related support should be provided through assessed contributions levied on all Member States. The necessary staff will now be deployed as quickly as possible and I am confident that, with the cooperation of the contributing Governments, the teething troubles which I have described will be rapidly overcome.

51. I should like to conclude this report by paying a tribute to the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar (India), and to all the military, police and civilian personnel under his command, for the exemplary manner in which, under his leadership, they continue to carry out an

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ever-expanding mandate in exceptionally difficult and dangerous circumstances. I also convey my gratitude to the Member States who have so willingly made personnel available for this unprecedentedly large operation and my condolences to those whose citizens have died or been wounded in the service of the United Nations.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24849
25 November 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 19 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the letter I sent to the President of the Security Council on 27 October 1992 (S/24714) transmitting to the Council a list of countries that have offered to furnish a battalion for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) as well as elements for the logistics unit of the operation.

Subsequently, Ireland also offered a logistic element. I should therefore be grateful to the Security Council for agreeing that Ireland should be added to the list of countries contributing contingents.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24850
25 November 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 24 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 19 November 1992 (S/24849) concerning the logistic support unit of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with your proposal contained therein.

(Signed) André ERDÖS
President of the Security Council



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24851
25 November 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the situation in Macedonia.

During a visit to Headquarters on 11 November 1992, Mr. Kiro Gligorov, President of Macedonia, conveyed to me a request for the deployment of United Nations observers in Macedonia in view of his concern about the possible impact on it of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

On 19 November 1992 I received a recommendation from Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, who had themselves had recent conversations with Mr. Gligorov, in favour of the very early deployment to Skopje of a small group of UNPROFOR military and police observers, with supporting political staff. Their immediate mandate would be to visit Macedonia's border areas with Albania and Serbia and prepare a report on how a larger deployment of United Nations military and police personnel might help to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia. I would envisage such a deployment, undertaken at the request of the competent authorities of Macedonia, as being a preventive deployment of the kind discussed in paragraphs 28 to 32 of "An Agenda for Peace".

I accordingly propose to instruct the Force Commander of UNPROFOR to dispatch forthwith a group of about a dozen military, police and civilian personnel on an exploratory mission to Macedonia. They would be asked to prepare a report on which I could then base a recommendation to the Security Council for a more substantive deployment of UNPROFOR in Macedonia.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24852
25 November 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 23 November 1992 (S/24851) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with your proposal of sending a group of military, police and civilian personnel as recommended by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and as requested by the concerned competent authorities.

(Signed) André ERDÖS
President of the Security Council



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24853
25 November 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter No. 1/6/371 of 5 October 1992 (S/24628), I have the pleasure to transmit to you herewith two video tapes* containing interviews with Iraqi prisoners who were deluded by the Iranian regime during their captivity and induced to commit acts against their country.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council and accept the two video tapes for safe keeping.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The videos may be consulted in room S-3520.